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Abstract. Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly ran-
domly matched to play a cyclic 2×2 game such as Matching Pennies. Between
matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a
ﬁnite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals from the
same population follow the same behavioral rule. In the resulting discrete time
dynamics the unique Nash equilibrium is unstable. However, for sample sizes
greater than one, we present an imitation rule where long run play cycles closely
around the equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary Game Theory has provided dynamic models of replication, imitation
and learning for analyzing change of play in games. The interpretation of a mixed
strategy as a polymorphic population state in which each individual chooses
a pure strategy is particularly appealing. However, in multi-population models
where individuals do not interact with their kin, mixed population states are
rarely predicted. This phenomenon ﬁrst appeared when Selten (1980) showed that
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of truly asymmetric contests cannot be mixed.
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More recently, focus has shifted away from static concepts and now lies more
on analyzing the population dynamics directly. However, none of the multi-
population models based on boundedly rational individual behavior with limited
individual information and memory have been able to predict mixed equilibria. In
fact, most of them generate the same population dynamics, namely the standard
replicator dynamics known from population biology (Bj¨ ornerstedt and Weibull,
1995; B¨ orgers and Sarin, 1997; Gale et al., 1995; Posch, 1997; Schlag, 1998).
Only models in which individuals have substantial information or memory
are known to predict mixed equilibria. Bj¨ ornerstedt and Weibull (1996) present
a model where individuals imitate others but need to know the average payoff
of each strategy being played in the population in order to know when to imi-
tate. This generates the adjusted replicator dynamics for which it is known that
the mixed equilibrium of Matching Pennies is asymptotically stable (Maynard
Smith, 1982, Appendix J). Fictitious play (Brown, 1951) and the continuous best
response dynamics (Hofbauer, 1995a) will also predict the mixed equilibrium in
Matching Pennies, and more generally in games that are equivalent to zero-sum
games. Under ﬁctitious play, individuals remember all previous moves of their
opponent, while the continuous time best response dynamics models a scenario
in which each individual knows the current distribution of pure strategies in the
opponent population(s).
The instability of interior equilibria under the more realistic scenarios of
information and memory have biased the evolutionary game theory literature
to focus on pure strategy equilibria and on set-valued solution concepts (cf.
Ritzberger and Weibull, 1995). However these approaches are of little use in
Matching Pennies: they either select the empty set or the entire strategy space.
One might then come to the conclusion that only individuals with substantial
information and/or extensive memory will learn to play a mixed equilibrium. We
show that this conclusion is not true; individuals only need to observe two other
individuals, to remember own outcome in the previous round and then to update
appropriately — imitating others in a sophisticated manner.
We consider discrete time evolutionary dynamics in cyclic 2×2 games such
as Matching Pennies where it is assumed that individuals play pure strategies.
We will analyze the properties of discrete time aggregate monotone dynamics
(Samuelson and Zhang, 1992) both in general and speciﬁcally when they can
be generated from the following micro model. Assume that individuals from
two large (i.e., inﬁnite) populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a
two person game such as a cyclic 2 × 2 game. Some individuals receive the
opportunity to change their strategy between rounds. Each of these observes a
random sample of the previous play and payoff of n other individuals from the
population. n will be called the sample size.
In this micro model, we assume that individuals belonging to the same pop-
ulation use the same behavioral rule. We restrict attention to individual behavior
(what to play next) that is only a function of the information in the sample and of
the own choice and payoff in the previous round. An example of such a behav-
ioral rule is the sequentially evaluated Proportional Observation Rule (SPORn,Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games 525
Schlag, 1999). Given this imitation rule, an individual considers each individual
in his sample separately, switching to the strategy observed with a probability
that is proportional to the observed payoff. This seemingly unintuitive behavior,
to ignore own payoff, is uniquely selected by Schlag (1999) who models opti-
mal individual boundedly rational behavior. We review the underlying arguments
from a new perspective in the appendix.
We ﬁnd that when all individuals use SPORn, then the resulting population
dynamics is an aggregate payoff monotone dynamics — a class of evolutonary
dynamics closely related to the replicator dynamics. This fact was previously
only known for n = 1 and n = 2 (Schlag, 1998, 1999). Interestingly enough,
the dynamics generated by SPORn tends to Maynard Smith’s adjusted replicator
dynamics when the sample size n grows to inﬁnity.
Before analyzing these dynamics, which are technically more involved as
they are in discrete time, we consider as a benchmark the usual continuous
time version which arises in the limit as the fraction of sampling individuals
tends to zero. Pollock and Schlag (1999) show that payoff monotonicity (which
is considerably more general than aggregate payoff monotonicity) and sample
size one induces continuous time dynamics that are — at least for 2 × 2 games
— still very similar to the standard replicator dynamics. This enables them to
show that for cyclic 2×2 games all solutions are periodic and cycle around the
equilibrium, compare also Hofbauer (1995b). In particular, this means that none
of the behavioral rules based on a single observation predicts play of the mixed
equilibrium.
We ﬁnd that a particular class of continuous time aggregate monotone dy-
namics, such as those induced by SPORn for n ≥ 2, make the mixed equilibrium
globally asymptotically stable. The condition for this result is that their scaling
factors are strictly decreasing in the current average population payoffs. Thus,
SPORn (n ≥ 2) is the ﬁrst example of an individual rule that induces a payoff
monotone dynamics that predicts play of a mixed equilibrium in the long run.
This is not a complete coincidence even though SPORn was developed for its
local performance. Behavioral rules with sample size one selected in (Schlag,
1998) lead to the standard replicator dynamics which has closed orbits in the
continuous version. SPORn is selected in (Schlag, 1999) as it leads to a stronger
increase in play of the current best response than under the selected single sample
rules, thus pushing the dynamics towards the mixed equilibrium.
It is important to consider the continuous time dynamics only as a benchmark
as almost all realistic learning processes take place in discrete time. Hence we
return to the discrete time dynamics. For sample size one, we follow Pollock
and Schlag (1999) to show that trajectories starting close to, but not in the
mixed equilibrium spiral to the border. Our investigation shows that the mixed
equilibrium remains unstable under any aggregate payoff monotone dynamic,
much in the spirit of Eshel and Akin (1983) and Crawford (1985). However,
although the population state is always pushed away from the mixed equilibrium,
we ﬁnd that the discrete time trajectories of those dynamics that lead to play of
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close if the fraction γ of individuals updating their play in each round is small.1
Consequently, mixed strategy equilibria need not be ruled out as predictors under
simple but sophisticated rules of behavior. At the same time we cannot expect
the long run population state to be exactly in the mixed Nash equilibrium. While
larger sample sizes under SPORn tend to decrease the distance of long run play
from the equilibrium, we show that this distance is bounded away from 0 for
any given γ.
Some intuition may be helpful. The condition of aggregate monotonicity
induces a speciﬁc structure of the linearized dynamics near the equilibrium.
Movement within one population only depends on play in the other which causes
trajectories to cycle in continuous time and spiral out in discrete time. This
instability of the equilibrium under the linearized dynamics cannot be overturned
by considering the explicit nonlinear dynamics. However, differences between
the linearized and the actual dynamics arise when the state is not close to the
equilibrium. These differences depend on the rule used. The trajectories of the
discrete time dynamics approximate those of the continuous time dynamics when
γ is small. As the continuous time dynamics under SPORn for n ≥ 2 lead
trajectories into the equilibrium, their discrete time dynamics will lead trajectories
close to the equilibrium when γ is small. Our calculations reveal that γ ≤ n−1
2n
already sufﬁces to lead trajectories under SPORn away from the boundary.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces how payoffs are
realized and how individuals can learn. SPORn is introduced and the associated
population dynamics are derived. Section 3 deﬁnes cyclic games and introduces
aggregate monotone dynamics. While continuous time dynamics are analyzed
in Section 4, Section 5 contains the more interesting and relevant discrete time
analysis. It is divided into subsections concerned with dynamics close to the
boundary and close to the equilibrium before considering the speciﬁc dynamics
induced by SPORn. Section 6 contains the conclusion and the appendix contains
more details on the foundations of SPORn.
2 Playing and updating
Consider a two person normal form (or bimatrix) game Γ in which player k
chooses a pure strategy from S k = {1,...,nk} where the payoff πk (i,j) that
player k receives after play (i,j) ∈ S 1 × S 2 is contained in a bounded open
interval
 
αk,ωk 
. Let ∆
 
S k 
denote the set of mixed strategies of player k and
let πk (p,q) =
 
i,j πk (i,j)piqj denote the expected payoff of player k when
player 1 chooses the mixed strategy p ∈ ∆
 
S 1 
and player 2 the mixed strategy
q ∈ ∆
 
S 2 
. er ∈ ∆
 
S k 
denotes the choice of pure strategy r with probability
one.
In the following we describe a model of boundedly rational individuals play-
ing this game. Assume that individuals have ﬁxed roles in the game Γ. They
belong to two inﬁnite populations, one corresponding to each player in the game.
1 In the paper, we allow for different fractions γk ∈ (0,1] in each population k, k =1 ,2.Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games 527
In a sequence of rounds, individuals from each population are randomly matched
to play the game.2
A state (p,q) ∈ ∆
 
S 1 
×∆
 
S 2 
describes the proportions of pure strategies
used in each population. Thus, the average payoff in population k is equal to
πk (p,q) in state (p,q).
Between rounds, each individual belonging to population k independently
receives the opportunity to change or update his play with probability γk. With
probability 1 − γk he must play the same pure strategy again. We will refer to
1 − γk as the level of inertia in population k.
An updating individual gathers information by sequentially and independently
sampling n individuals from the same population and observes the (pure) strategy
used and the payoff obtained in the previous round by each of these individuals
(n ∈ N,0<γ k ≤ 1, k =1 ,2). Sampling probabilities are modelled as if
populations were ﬁnite and each individual not yet observed is sampled equally
likely. Formally, the probability that an individual from population 1 with the
opportunity to update after round t observes an individual who obtained the
payoff π1 (i,j) is set equal to pt
iqt
j . The case n = 1 is called single sampling,
n =2double sampling.
The individual’s decision what to play in the next round as a function of his
previous information will be called his behavioral rule. We will restrict attention
to simple behavioral rules that only depend on information gathered since the
previous round and not on previous information or play nor on the number of the
round. For example, a behavioral rule under single sampling can be described as
a map
F : S k ×
 
αk,ωk 
× S k ×
 
αk,ωk 
→ ∆
 
S k 
where F (i,x,j,y)r is the probability of playing strategy r in the next round after
playing strategy i and receiving payoff x and observing an individual who used
strategy j and obtained payoff y. More generally, a behavioral rule for sample
size n is a map
F : S k ×
 
αk,ωk 
×
 
S k ×
 
αk,ωk  n
→ ∆
 
S k 
.
Throughout we will be concerned with common updating where all individ-
uals belonging to the same population follow the same behavioral rule. In this
way, the population dynamics given individual behavior is uniquely described
by the change of the state over time, as given by recurrence equations
pt+1
i = pt
i + γ1 · fi
 
pt,qt 
· pt
i
qt+1
j = qt
j + γ2 · gj
 
pt,qt 
· qt
j (1)
for appropriately chosen functions fi,g j : ∆
 
S 1 
×∆
 
S 2 
→ R (i ∈ S 1, j ∈ S 2),
such that (pt,qt)  → (pt+1,qt+1) deﬁnes a map from ∆(S 1) × ∆(S 2) into itself.
2 As the populations are inﬁnite, this means that an individual in population 1 is matched with an
individual playing j in population 2 with probability qj in state (p,q).528 J. Hofbauer and K.H. Schlag
2.1 An important example
Consider the following simple algorithm to construct a behavioral rule for general
sample sizes n using a single sampling rule F. Apply the rule F in sequence to
each individual in the sample, replacing own strategy and payoff by observed
strategy and payoff whenever the rule F prescribes to switch strategies. The
strategy left with after applying this procedure to each individual in the sample
is the strategy to be played in the next round. This generates a behavioral rule
for sample size n we will refer to as sequentially evaluating the rule F. In the
following we will demonstrate this procedure and the resulting dynamic equations
in more detail for the Proportional Observation Rule.
The Proportional Observation Rule ˜ F (POR, Schlag, 1999) for an individual
in population k is deﬁned by
˜ F (i,x,i,y)i =1
˜ F (i,x,j,y)j =
y − αk
ωk − αk =1− ˜ F (i,x,j,y)i ,i / = j.
Notice that POR is an imitation rule since it either prescribes to switch to a
strategy sampled or not to switch at all. POR speciﬁes to imitate the observed
individual with a probability that is proportional to the payoff of the sampled
individual and independent of own payoff.
When all individuals use the respective POR the population state changes
according to (a discrete version of) the standard replicator dynamics of Taylor
(1979) (with step-sizes γk, see Schlag, 1998):
pt+1
i = pt
i +
γ1
ω1 − α1
 
π1  
i,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt  
· pt
i
qt+1
j = qt
j +
γ2
ω2 − α2
 
π2  
pt,j
 
− π2  
pt,qt  
· qt
j (2)
Next we sequentially evaluate POR to obtain a double sampling rule ˜ F(2)
(which we also will denote by SPOR2) for n = 2. It follows, for i / = j and r / = j
that
˜ F(2) (i,x,j,y,j,z)j =
y − αk
ωk − αk +
ωk − y
ωk − αk
z − αk
ωk − αk
˜ F(2) (i,x,r,y,j,z)j =
z − αk
ωk − αk
˜ F(2) (i,x,j,y,r,z)j =
y − αk
ωk − αk
ωk − z
ωk − αk .
When all individuals use the SPOR2 applied to the appropriate payoff range  
αk,ωk 
then we obtain the population dynamics (see Schlag, 1999)
pt+1
i = pt
i +
γ1
ω1 − α1
 
1+
ω1 − π1  
pt,qt 
ω1 − α1
 
 
π1  
i,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt  
pt
i
qt+1
j = qt
j +
γ2
ω2 − α2
 
1+
ω2 − π2  
pt,qt 
ω2 − α2
 
 
π2  
pt,j
 
− π2  
pt,qt  
qt
j .(3)Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games 529
When verifying (3), it is helpful to consider switching behavior even when an
individual observes someone using the same strategy. Then the additional term
ω1 − π1  
pt,qt 
ω1 − α1 =
 
i∈S 1
pt
i
 
1 −
π1  
i,qt 
− α1
ω1 − α1
 
as compared to the single sampling case (2) is the probability that an individual
does not switch after evaluating POR to the ﬁrst individual in the sample.
For general n, if each individual uses the rule derived by sequentially eval-
uating POR (which we will call SPORn) we obtain the following population
dynamics
pt+1
i − pt
i =
γ1
ω1 − α1

1+
ω1 − π1  
pt,qt 
ω1 − α1 + ...+
 
ω1 − π1  
pt,qt 
ω1 − α1
 n−1

·
 
π1  
i,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt  
· pt
i
qt+1
j − qt
j =
γ2
ω2 − α2

1+
ω2 − π2  
pt,qt 
ω2 − α2 + ...+
 
ω2 − π2  
pt,qt 
ω2 − α2
 n−1

·
 
π2  
pt,j
 
− π2  
pt,qt  
· qt
j . (4)
The population dynamics induced by SPORn satisﬁes
π1  
pt+1,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt 
=
 
i∈S 1
 
pt+1
i − pt
i
  
π1  
i,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt  
=
γ1
ω1 − α1

1+
ω1 − π1  
pt,qt 
ω1 − α1 + .. +
 
ω1 − π1  
pt,qt 
ω1 − α1
 n−1

·
 
i∈S 1
 
π1  
i,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt  2
· pt
i ≥ 0
where π1  
pt+1,qt 
>π 1  
pt,qt 
whenever π1  
i,qt 
>π 1  
pt,qt 
holds for
some i with pt
i > 0. This property of SPORn is called strictly improving and
is the starting point that leads Schlag (1999) to argue (also from an individual
standpoint) that this rule is the best sequentially evaluated single sampling rule
for n = 2. In the appendix we rephrase the essential arguments in a new light
and add why sampling more is better under this rule (Proposition 6).
In the limit n →∞ , (4) converges to (a discretization of) the so-called
adjusted replicator dynamic introduced by Maynard Smith (1982, Appendix J):
pt+1
i = pt
i + γ1 · pt
i ·
π1  
i,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt 
π1 (pt,qt) − α1
qt+1
j = qt
j + γ2 · qt
j ·
π2  
pt,j
 
− π2  
pt,qt 
π2 (pt,qt) − α2 . (5)530 J. Hofbauer and K.H. Schlag
3 Cyclic 2 × 2 games and aggregate monotonicity
In the remaining sections we restrict attention to cyclic 2×2 games. We call the
bimatrix game Γ with
 
 S 1 
  =
 
 S 2 
  =2acyclic 2×2 game if the four pure states
form a best response cycle, or equivalently, if it has a unique Nash equilibrium
E = (ˆ p, ˆ q) where E is in the interior of ∆
 
S 1 
× ∆
 
S 2 
=[ 0 ,1]2. Examples
include the buyer–seller game (Friedman, 1991; see also Pollock and Schlag,
1999), the model by Cressman et al. (1998) of crime deterrence, Dawkins’ battle
of the sexes game (see Maynard Smith, 1982; or Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988)
and (generalized) Matching Pennies, the latter given by the following normal
form
12
1 ν,µ µ,ν
2 µ,ν ν,µ
(6)
where µ/ = ν and E =
  1
2, 1
2
 
,
 1
2, 1
2
  
. Cyclic games are a simple testing
ground for whether bounded rational learning rules such as SPORn can lead
large populations (close) to a completely mixed Nash equilibrium.
General discrete time dynamics as given in (1) (not necessarily derived from
the sampling scenario in Section 2) are aggregate monotone regular selection
dynamics (Samuelson and Zhang, 1992) if there exist strictly positive continuous
functions φk such that (1) can be rewritten as:
pt+1
i = pt
i + γ1pt
i
 
π1(i,qt) − π1(pt,qt)
 
φ1  
pt,qt 
qt+1
j = qt
j + γ2qt
j
 
π2(pt,j) − π2(pt,qt)
 
φ2  
pt,qt 
. (7)
The dynamics (4) induced by SPORn belongs to this class, with the factors
φk depending on the state (p,q) only through the average payoffs: φk = Φk ◦ πk
for some functions Φk. As a benchmark we will also consider the continuous
time version of (7) that results, after replacing t + 1 in (7) by t + ∆t and setting
γ1 = γ2 = ∆t, as the limit ∆t → 0, and is given by the system of differential
equations
˙ pi = pi
 
π1(i,q) − π1(p,q)
 
φ1  
pt,qt 
˙ qj = qj
 
π2(p,j) − π2(p,q)
 
φ2  
pt,qt 
. (8)
The ﬁrst aggregate monotone dynamics, besides the standard replicator dy-
namics of Taylor (1979), for which the factors φk are identical 1, was suggested
by Maynard Smith (1982, Appendix J), with
φk(p,q)=
1
Ck + πk(p,q)
, (9)
the Ck being positive constants (standing for background ﬁtness). However, no
convincing derivation has been given for this choice. As seen from (5) in Sec-
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4 The continuous time limit
It is popular in evolutionary game theory to simplify analysis by taking appro-
priate limits and transforming discrete dynamics into continuous time dynamics.
For us this approach helps understanding the discrete time dynamics in the next
section.
It is well known that the trajectories of the continuous time version (8) of
the population dynamics (2) for POR ≡ SPOR1 form closed orbits around E.
Hofbauer (1995b) and Pollock and Schlag (1999) extend this to more general
imitation rules with n =1 . Our next result shows that the mixed equilibrium
can be the unique predictor when n ≥ 2. This happens for aggregate monotone
dynamics (8) where the multipliers are strictly decreasing functions of the average
population payoff.
Theorem 1 If φk ≡ Φk ◦πk for some strictly decreasing strictly positive functions
Φk, as under SPORn for n ≥ 2, or Maynard Smith’s choice (9), then the mixed
equilibrium E is globally asymptotically stable for (8).
While the proof is more technical we can provide some intuition behind
this result for SPORn. Trajectories under the continuous best response dynamics
converge to E (Brown, 1951; Hofbauer, 1995a) while SPOR1 just barely does
not increase best responses enough as it induces the standard replicator dynamics
which have closed orbits around E. Proposition 6 in the appendix implies that
SPORn for n ≥ 2 leads in almost all states to a stronger increase of the best
response in 2 × 2 games than SPOR1.
Proof. It was shown in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, p. 282), that for May-
nard Smith’s choice (9), after dividing the vectorﬁeld (8) by the common factor  
pi
 
qj (which has only the effect of a change of time scale), the divergence is
negative and hence the ﬂow on int∆(S 1) × ∆(S 2) decreases volume. The same
calculation actually applies to strictly decreasing multiplier functions Φk.3 For
2 × 2 games this means that the ﬂow of (8) is area decreasing in (0,1)2. The
theorems of Poincar´ e–Bendixson and Bendixson–Dulac (see Hofbauer and Sig-
mund, 1988) imply then the global asymptotic stability of the mixed equilibrium
E for cyclic 2 × 2 games.    
5 The discrete time dynamics
Next we consider the discrete time aggregate monotone dynamics (7). Pollock
and Schlag (1999) suggest that for n = 1 all orbits (except the equilibrium E)
converge to the boundary (for every γk ∈ (0,1]), see Proposition 4 below for
more details. This implies that most of the time, all individuals in the same
population are playing the same pure (non-equilibrium) strategy. Thus, we can
only expect predictive power of E if n ≥ 2.
3 Compare also the proof of Proposition 5 in Ritzberger and Weibull (1995, p. 1396) for an
opposite result for increasing multiplier functions.532 J. Hofbauer and K.H. Schlag
Before going into details we brieﬂy summarize our results. While the Nash
equilibrium E remains locally unstable for any aggregate monotone dynamics, we
get more positive results for the dynamics (4) induced by SPORn. The proportion
γk of individuals in each population receiving information plays an important
role. For a given sample size n ≥ 2, if too many individuals receive information
(i.e., if γk are too large) then the boundary remains attracting. However, if γk ≤
n−1
2n then the boundary is repelling in all cyclic 2 × 2 games and long run play
is closer to the equilibrium than under a single sample. For Matching Pennies
games we derive the much better correct bound in (19). If γk is sufﬁciently small
then the long run states form a limit cycle which is close to E. Simulations are
added in Section 5.3 to exemplify the speciﬁc relations. There we observe that
a limit cycle is reached whenever the boundary is repelling.
5.1 Behavior near the boundary
In the following we present sufﬁcient conditions for determining the behavior of
the dynamics close to the boundary of the square {(p,q)|p1 · p2 · q1 · q2 =0 }.
At the corner
 
ei,ej
 
we ﬁnd (er − ei,0) to be the eigenvector corresponding
to the eigenvalue
λij→rj := 1 + γ1
 
π1(r,j) − π1(i,j)
 
φ1(i,j) (10)
and
 
0,el − ej
 
the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue
λij→il := 1 + γ2
 
π2(i,l) − π2(i,j)
 
φ2(i,j) . (11)
Notice that λij→rj is the growth rate pt+1
r /pt
r when almost all individuals in
population one play i and the rest play r and all individuals in population two play
j. Since payoffs to player k are from the open interval (αk,ωk), the eigenvalues
(10, 11) are positive for (4) and (5) and all 0 ≤ γk ≤ 1.
Consider now a cyclic 2×2 bimatrix game as deﬁned in Section 3. Assume
that the best reply cycle runs clockwise as
π1 (2,1) <π 1 (1,1),π 2 (1,1) <π 2 (1,2),
π1 (1,2) <π 1 (2,2),π 2 (2,2) <π 2 (2,1). (12)
Then the boundary of the unit square is invariant under the dynamics (7)
and forms a heteroclinic cycle, i.e., a closed loop of stable/unstable manifolds
of saddle points. The stability of this heteroclinic cycle is determined by the
quantity
ρ = ρ11→12 · ρ12→22 · ρ22→21 · ρ21→11 (13)
with (β,δ denoting pairs of numbers belonging to {1,2})
ρβ→δ =
logλβ→δ
|logλδ→β|
. (14)Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games 533
Note that ρ is the product of logs of ‘outgoing’ eigenvalues divided by the product
of logs of ‘incoming’ eigenvalues around the cycle (12). ρ is well-deﬁned since
the eigenvalues (10, 11) are different from 1 whenever γk > 0. The following
is a discrete time version of a related result for differential equations, see e.g.
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, p. 213f).
Lemma 1 If ρ>1 (resp. ρ<1) then the boundary of the square is repelling
(resp. attracting) for the dynamics (7).
Proposition 1 Assume that the multipliers in the aggregate monotone dynamics
(7) depend only on average payoffs, i.e., have the form φk ≡ Φk ◦ πk and let
ψk(x): =1 /Φk(x). Suppose that
dψ
k(x)
dx >γ k holds in the payoff range of player k
for k =1 ,2. Then ρ>1 and the boundary of the square is repelling: There exists
δ>0 such that for each completely mixed initial condition (p0,q0), there exists
t0 such that pi(t) >δand qi(t) >δfor i =1 ,2 and t ≥ t0.
This means that each pure strategy will be used with a certain positive prob-
ability δ>0 after time t0.
Proof. We show that ρ12→22 > 1, the other three factors in (13) being analogous.
Inserting (10) into (14) we obtain
ρ12→22 =
log(1 + γ1(π1(2,2) − π1(1,2))Φ1  
π1 (1,2)
 
)
|log(1 + γ1(π1(1,2) − π1(2,2))Φ1  
π1 (2,2)
 
)|
(15)
Denote a := π1(2,2) − π1(1,2) > 0 and b := π1(1,2). Then the inequality
ρ12→22 > 1 can be equivalently reformulated as
ρ12→22 =
log(1 + γ1aΦ1(b))
−log(1 − γ1aΦ1(b + a))
> 1
log(1 + γ1aΦ1(b)) > −log(1 − γ1aΦ1(b + a))
(1 + γ1aΦ1(b))(1 − γ1aΦ1(b + a)) > 1 (16)
Φ1(b) − Φ1(b + a) >γ 1aΦ1(b)Φ1(b + a)
ψ1(b + a) − ψ1(b) >γ 1a
By the mean value theorem, this last inequality holds whenever (ψ1) (x) >γ 1
for all x in the payoff range.    
A similar calculation shows:
Proposition 2 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, if
dψ
k(x)
dx <γ k holds in
the payoff range of player k for k =1 ,2 then ρ<1 and the boundary of the
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5.2 Behavior near the interior equilibrium
Linearizing (7) at an interior equilibrium E leads to a matrix of the form I +
γJ with I the identity matrix, γ = diag (γ1,γ 2), and J the linearization of the
corresponding differential equation (8) at E. For 2×2 games, (8) can be written
(with p = p1 and q = q1)a s
˙ p = p(1 − p)
 
π1(1,q) − π1(2,q)
 
φ1  
pt,qt 
˙ q = q(1 − q)
 
π2(p,1) − π2(p,2)
 
φ2  
pt,qt 
. (17)
Given an interior equilibrium E =(ˆ p, ˆ q)o fa2×2 game, (17) can be written in
the form
˙ p =( q − ˆ q)c1(p,q)˙ q =(ˆ p − p)c2(p,q) (18)
where the factors ci(p,q) (which are essentially the φi) have constant sign on
(0,1)2. For a cyclic 2 × 2 game (12) both ci(p,q) are positive. From (18) one
can read off the linearization at E, J =
 
0 c1
−c2 0
 
, with ci = ci(ˆ p, ˆ q) for
short. Hence the eigenvalues of J are the imaginary numbers ±i
√
c1c2, showing
the oscillatory behavior of the solutions near E. Hence the eigenvalues of the
discrete model (7) at E are given by 1±i
√
γ1γ2c1c2. Since their absolute value
is larger than 1 we obtain (compare also Eshel and Akin, 1983; Crawford, 1985):
Proposition 3 E is a spiral repeller for (7) for every choice of the multiplier
functions φk and of the step sizes γk > 0.
We provide some geometric intuition for this result. Aggregate monotonicity
causes there to be almost no change of frequencies in population 1 (2) when q1
(p1) is near the equilibrium value ˆ q1 (ˆ p1). This eliminates own population effects,
nearby the equilibrium the dynamics in one population are mainly driven by the
frequencies in the other population. This causes ﬁrst order effects (determined
by the linearization) of the continuous dynamics near the equilibrium to lead to
closed orbits. The discrete dynamics moves tangent to the trajectories of the con-
tinuous dynamics, so in each round the ﬁrst order effect of the dynamics crosses
orbits of the continuous dynamics, moving outwards away from the equilibrium.
Thus, the ﬁrst order effects of the discrete dynamics spiral out which carries
over to the actual discrete dynamics to yield our result that E is a spiral repeller.
In other words, the ﬁrst order effects of an aggregate monotone dynamics in a
cyclic game have the same properties as the dynamics of the standard replicator
dynamic: in the continuous version E is neutrally stable, in the discrete version
it is a spiral repeller.
The above is a purely local result, however. If the resulting dynamics is
aggregate monotone with multipliers Φk that are decreasing functions, as under
SPORn or the Maynard Smith dynamics (5), we can say more. Recall the global
stability result for the continuous dynamics given in Theorem 1. Using a pertur-
bation argument from numerical dynamics, namely the upper-semicontinuity of
an asymptotically stable set (see e.g. Stuart, 1994), there is an attractor A(γ)i nSophisticated imitation in cyclic games 535
the discrete time model (7), with strictly decreasing Φk, which converges to E,a s
γ = γ1 = γ2 → 0. In other words, for small γ, the attractor4 of (7) is close to the
equilibrium E. Furthermore, it follows from the investigation in Hofbauer and
Iooss (1984) that for small γ, this attractor A(γ) of (7) is a stable ‘limit cycle’,
i.e., a closed invariant curve surrounding the equilibrium (most likely with an
irrational rotation–like dynamics on it).
5.3 Application to the SPORn imitation dynamics
Now we apply the above results to the imitation models SPORn introduced in
Section 2. In the case n = 1, i.e., for (2), the multipliers are simply constants
φk =( ωk − αk)−1. Hence ψ  = 0 and Proposition 2 implies that the boundary is
attracting. In fact it is globally attracting:
Proposition 4 For cyclic 2 × 2 game all orbits (except the equilibrium) of the
discrete version of the replicator dynamics (2) converge to the boundary (for every
γk ∈ (0,1]).
Proof. If we incorporate the factors
γk
ωk−αk into the payoff functions πk then the
increment of the map (2) is precisely the vector ﬁeld (8) or (17), with φk ≡ 1, of
the standard replicator dynamics. For cyclic 2 × 2 games this has a constant of
motion of the form P = p
β1
1 p
β2
2 q
β3
1 q
β4
2 (with βi > 0), see Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1988). Since this function P is strictly concave, its tangent vector ﬁeld (17)
points everywhere outwards. Therefore P decreases monotonically along each
trajectory of (2) (except E and on the boundary) and tends to 0. This shows that
the boundary is a global attractor for (2).    
In the case n = 2, i.e., for the aggregate monotone dynamics (3), the multipli-
ers Φk are given by Φk(x)= 1
ωk−αk
 
1+ ω
k−x
ωk−αk
 
. Hence ψ(x)=
(ω
k−α
k)
2
2ωk−αk−x and
ψ (x)=
(ω
k−α
k)
2
(2ωk−αk−x)2. Since ψ is convex, ψ  attains its minimum and maximum
value at the ends of its domain, i.e., αk and ωk resp. Hence 1
4 <ψ  (x) < 1.
More generally, for ﬁnite n ≥ 2, a longer calculation shows n−1
2n <ψ  (x) < 1.
In the limiting case n →∞ , for the map (5) we have Φ(x)=( x − αk)−1,
hence ψ (x) = 1. Then proposition 1 shows that the boundary is repelling for
every γk < 1.
Summarizing, we obtain the following results for the dynamics (4) resulting
under the use of SPORn for given n:5
Theorem 2 1. The Nash equilibrium is unstable for every cyclic 2 × 2 game.
4 General theory implies also that the basin of attraction of A(γ) contains most of the state space,
e.g. (δ,1−δ)2 \E with δ = δ(γ) → 0a sγ → 0. It is very likely that A(γ) attracts all interior orbits
except E. However, the technicalities of such a proof are beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Under continuous dynamics (8) obtained through taking the limit γ1 = γ2 → 0, trajectories
cycle in closed orbits around E when n = 1 whereas E is globally attracting for n ≥ 2, as we have
seen in Section 4.536 J. Hofbauer and K.H. Schlag
Fig. 1. The critical value γ (n) as a function of sample size n for Matching Pennies with (µ,ν) = (1,2)
and (α,ω) = (0,3)
2. For γ1 = γ2 =1the boundary is attracting for every cyclic 2 × 2 game and
for every n. The same holds for n =1and 0 <γ k ≤ 1.
3. For γk ≤ n−1
2n the boundary is repelling for every cyclic 2 × 2 game.
4. For any given cyclic 2 × 2 game, and any n, there is a value γ(n) ∈ (n−1
2n ,1)
with γ(n) → 1 as n →∞such that for 0 <γ k <γ (n), the boundary is
repelling, while for γ(n) <γ k ≤ 1, the boundary is attracting.
5. For 0 <γ k <γ (n), the interior attractor A(n,γ) is a closed, annulus–shaped
set, disjoint from E and the boundary. If γk = γck (with ck positive constants)
then for small γ>0, this attractor is a smooth closed invariant curve close
to E.
6. For a given cyclic 2 × 2 game and given 0 <γ 1,γ 2 < 1, there is a ﬁnite
n(γ) such that for n ≥ n(γ) the boundary is repelling. The attractors A(n,γ)
converge6 to the interior attractor A(∞,γ) of (5). Hence, the attractors A(n,γ)
are bounded away from E, uniformly in n.
Statements 1–3 were shown above. Statement 4 follows from the monotone
dependence of (13, 14, 15) on the step-sizes γk and the fact that ψ (x) → 1a sn →
∞ uniformly on each compact subinterval of the open interval (αk,ωk). Statement
5 follows from the discussion at the end of Section 5.2. Statement 6 follows again
from the upper semicontinuity of asymptotically stable sets (here A(∞,γ)) and
the robustness of the repellors E and the boundary against perturbations (from
(5) to (4) with large n).
6 In the sense that every neighbourhood of A(∞,γ) contains A(n,γ) for all large enough nSophisticated imitation in cyclic games 537
Fig. 2. Distance of the limit cycle from E as a function of γ in Matching Pennies with (µ,ν) = (1,2)
and (α,ω) = (0,3); left: n = 2, right: n = ∞
Following Theorem 2, when γk <γ (n) then all long run outcomes will
be bounded away both from E and from the boundary. General results for the
location and the form of this attracting set are not known. Only for sufﬁciently
small γ there are rigorous results: In this case it is a smooth curve surrounding E,
and the distance of this ‘limit cycle’ from the equilibrium behaves like a constant
(depending on n) times
√
γ, so it increases faster than linear (see Hofbauer and
Iooss, 1984, for details). Numerical simulations suggest that the attractor remains
a smooth curve for larger values of γ until it merges the boundary heteroclinic
cycle. No ‘fat’ annuli have been observed in these simulations. Figure 2 shows
the behavior of the distance of these curves from the equilibrium.
For a Matching Pennies game (6) with payoffs µ<νin the interval (α,ω),
the critical values γ (n) follow from the calculation in (16):
γ (n) =
ψn(ν) − ψn(µ)
ν − µ
=
1
ν − µ
  ν − α
1 −
  ω−ν
ω−α
 n −
µ − α
1 −
 ω−µ
ω−α
 n
 
. (19)
Figure 1 shows a plot of these values γ(n) against n =1 ,...,10 for (µ,ν) =
(1,2) and payoff range (α,ω) = (0,3). The ﬁgure indicates that for n ≥ 2
the range of values γ below the curve (for which there exists a limit cycle) is
substantial and quickly grows towards 1.
Figure 2: For Matching Pennies with (µ,ν) = (1,2) and payoff range (α,ω) =
(0,3) we plot the distance of the attracting limit cycle from the Nash equilibrium
(measured on the ray q = 1
2,p > 1
2) against the step-size γ. In the left diagram
we use n = 2, for which the boundary is reached for γ ≈ .4 7 while the right
diagram shows the graph for the limit case n = ∞, for which the boundary is
reached only at γ =1 .
7 This value is taken from numerical simulations, while the precise value follows from (19) as
9
20 =0 .45. This discrepancy reﬂects the extremely quick approach to the boundary: the distance of
the limit cycle to the boundary seems to be a ﬂat function (all derivatives 0) at the critical value of
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6 Conclusion
In cyclic 2 × 2 games, there is a basic difference in the long run dynamics of
POR≡SPOR1 on the one hand and SPORn for n ≥ 2 on the other hand. The
discrete time dynamics resulting from single sampling diverges to the boundary,
leading to a strange aperiodic oscillatory behavior, with geometrically increasing
sojourn times near the pure states, similar to the behavior of ﬁctitious play in
Shapley’s example. In practical terms this would mean that almost surely one of
these pure (non-equilibrium) states is reached and the population is stuck there
because it is an absorbing state for imitators. It would need some best reply
players to get away again.
In contrast, if two or more individuals are sampled, and if the γk are not too
large, then the population dynamics runs into a limit cycle repeating behavior in a
periodic or quasi-periodic fashion. Moreover, this limit cycle shrinks to the Nash
equilibrium when the fractions γk of individuals receiving information between
rounds goes to zero.
In this sense the interior Nash equilibrium (for Matching Pennies like games)
can still be justiﬁed by evolutionary arguments based on the SPORn model for
n ≥ 2, while it cannot for n =1 .
Differences among the SPORn for different sample sizes n ≥ 2 are less
severe. SPOR2 clearly has the advantage that it relies on the least observations
and hence can be argued to be least costly. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that
sampling more is better. For interior states where players are not indifferent,
current best responses increase stronger in each round under higher sample sizes
(see Proposition 6 on the last page of the Appendix). Thus, it is very plausible
that higher sample sizes should lead long run play closer to the equilibrium.
However, there is a limit to what larger sample sizes can achieve as play is
uniformly bounded away from the equilibrium for all sample sizes (see Theorem
2 (6)). An interesting topic for future research is to assume that sampling is
costly, that individuals have different sample sizes n and that individuals using
SPORn not only imitate successful strategies but also the associated sample size.
SPORn is a sophisticated imitation rule. Here, sophistication is in the sense
that the probabilities of switching under POR are chosen to ensure the strictly
improving condition for SPORn. Strictly improving requires “nice” behavior in a
large variety of environments and one might wonder which alternative behavior
selected speciﬁcally for a given cyclic game might yield an aggregate monotone
dynamics and stabilize the Nash equilibrium too. We cited Pollock and Schlag
(1999) to show that sample sizes larger than one are necessary. Probabilistic
strategy selection also remains a necessary ingredient. It is easily veriﬁed that
deterministic imitation rules such as the popular, simple, and seemingly more
intuitive, imitation rules Imitate The Best (Axelrod, 1984) and Imitate Best Aver-
age (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993) do not induce a payoff monotone dynamics
(the Nash equilibrium even fails to be a rest point) for almost all cyclic 2 × 2
games. This is due to the insensitivity of these rules to small payoff changes. A
similar result also holds when individuals play a best response to a ﬁnite sampleSophisticated imitation in cyclic games 539
of previous strategies among their potential opponents. This rule fails to respond
sufﬁciently accurately to the frequencies of strategies played in the opponent
population (see Pollock and Schlag, 1999).
Some sophistication on the part of the players is required to lead them away
from unreasonable behavior and bring them closer to Nash equilibrium. It may
be worth pointing out another case, where sophistication has a stabilizing effect:
In biology, (2) and related (discrete time) models are based on the not always
realistic assumption of haploid, asexual individuals which reproduce by cloning.
Taking account of the genetic structure, namely diploid inheritance, again leads
to a stable limit cycle in the games8 considered here, see Maynard Smith and
Hofbauer (1987), or Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, p. 312 ff).
Some comments on the feasible set of behavioral rules may be added. Indi-
viduals do not remember occurrences prior to the previous round. All individuals
belonging to the same population use the same rule. While an investigation of
weaker assumptions seems interesting, both of these assumptions are necessary if
the dynamics should take the standard form of evolutionary dynamics. These dy-
namics are autonomous with the state of the process being the vector of frequen-
cies of play. Another important assumption is that individuals do not know which
round they are in. This generates stationary behavioral rules. If non-stationary
rules were to be allowed then it is conceivable that some lead to play of the Nash
equilibrium in the long run. We believe that this is true for the non-stationary
rule that speciﬁes for round t to use SPORn (n ≥ 2) with probability 1/t and to
keep the previous strategy otherwise.9
Notice that the stabilizing behavior of double (or more) sampling in cyclic
2 × 2 games also has an important impact on the following “larger” game.
Oechssler and Schlag (2000) ﬁnd for a simple extensive-form game that the
backwards induction outcome ceases to be stable under single sampling sophis-
ticated imitation once observations are imperfect. Our analysis can be used to
show that stability is recovered under double (or more) sampling.
Despite our positive results, stability of interior equilibria or even conver-
gence of learning processes should not be generally expected in any game that
has a unique equilibrium, even under sufﬁciently sophisticated learning rules,
such as ﬁctitious play or SPORn, and even with continuous time (Shapley, 1964;
Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer, 1995; Hofbauer and Swinkels, 1995). However,
cyclic games such as Matching Pennies are sufﬁciently simple. Individuals have
an incentive to take advantage of cyclic patterns and to invest in more infor-
mation or in more memory if necessary. Hence, when payoffs in such games
are important, then we expect individuals to choose sophisticated behavior that
leads to (or approximates behavior of) the Nash equilibrium. To explicitly model
8 Cyclic 2×2 games arise in biology as the ‘battle of the sexes’ game introduced by Dawkins as
a model of the parental investment conﬂict, see Maynard Smith (1982).
9 General theorems like in Garay and Hofbauer (1997) imply that such a trajectory converges
either to E or to the boundary. That the latter does not occur seems rather plausible, but it requires
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evolution of rules in this context is an interesting topic of future research with
useful results already contained in (Pollock and Schlag, 1999).
Appendix
A Sophisticated imitation
In the following we will brieﬂy review the properties of SPOR1 and SPOR2
in a new light using a domination argument to then argue why SPORn can be
considered the best sequentially evaluated rule.
A.1 Strictly improving behavior
Schlag (1998) develops a theory of optimal behavior for individuals that are
boundedly rational in the following sense. Each individual only knows his own
strategy set together with the bounded interval containing his payoffs. Whenever
an individual changes his choice then he only uses information he has obtained
since the previous round.
Various scenarios are introduced to motivate the following selection among
behavioral rules. The individual searches for a rule F that, when used by all others
in his population, always causes the average payoff in his population to increase
over time should the individuals in the other population not change their play.
This increase should be strict whenever not all strategies played in population
k achieve the same expected payoff. Formally this means (for an individual of
population 1) that the induced dynamics satisfy
π1  
pt+1 (F),qt 
≥ π1  
pt,qt 
for all
 
pt,qt 
∈ ∆
 
S 1 
× ∆
 
S 2 
where > holds if there exists i (20)
s.t. π1  
i,qt 
>π 1  
pt,qt 
and pt
i > 0.
Notice that we wrote pt+1 (F) instead of pt+1 to emphasize that dynamics in pop-
ulation 1 are driven by the behavioral rule F. Given the individual’s knowledge,
the above condition is required for any round t, any state
 
pt,qt 
in round t,
and game Γ with strategy sets S 1 and S 2 that generates payoffs for player k in  
αk,ωk 
. A behavioral rule for an individual belonging to population 1 with this
property is called strictly improving.
When
 
 S 1 
  = 2 then (21) implies that the proportion of individuals in popu-
lation 1 playing a best response to the population state of the last round always
increases.
It is easily shown that rules of the general form presented in Section 2 which
are strictly improving are imitating.10 Of course, not all imitating rules are strictly
improving.
10 The proof for n =1 ,2 contained in (Schlag, 1999) extends immediately to general sample sizes
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Consider now the population dynamics (4) under SPORn. Then
π1  
pt+1,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt 
=
 
i∈S 1
 
pt+1
i − pt
i
  
π1  
i,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt  
=
γ1
ω1−α1
 
1+
ω
1−π
1(p
t,q
t)
ω1−α1 + .. +
 
ω
1−π
1(p
t,q
t)
ω1−α1
 n−1 
·
 
i∈S 1
 
π1  
i,qt 
− π1  
pt,qt  2
· pt
i ≥ 0.
which leads to the following result [see also Schlag 1998 and 1999 for n =1 ,2].
Proposition 5 SPORn generates a strictly improving rule for any sample size n.
A.2 A case for optimality
As demonstrated above, SPORn is strictly improving. In the following we will
demonstrate the unique properties of SPORn. While we will be relying on many
results obtained in other papers, the presentation below will put these in new
light.
Consider two behavioral rules F and G for player one. We say that F domi-
nates G if the terms in (20) are always larger under F than under G, with strict
inequality in some cases, i.e., if
π1  
pt+1 (F),qt 
≥ π1  
pt+1 (G),qt 
for any feasible payoff distributions in Γ and any state
 
pt,qt 
in round t, and
not “≡”. Notice that a strictly improving rule dominates the rule “never switch
strategies”. The notion of domination is a very stringent condition and hence
only deﬁnes a partial order on the set of behavioral rules. In the following we
will point out some rules that are best according to dominance in a given set of
rules. We will say that F is undominated in the set of rules D if F ∈ D and if
there is no rule G ∈ D that dominates F.
The properties of SPORn for single (Schlag, 1998) and double (Schlag, 1999)
sampling, stated in terms of dominance, are as follows.
(Single sampling) SPOR1 ≡POR is undominated among the strictly improv-
ing single sampling behavioral rules. Any other single sampling rule with this
property11 induces the same population adjustment (2) as POR.
(Double sampling) SPOR2 is the unique rule that is undominated among the
sequentially evaluated rules. SPOR2 dominates POR. In fact, in 2 × 2 games,
SPOR2 is undominated among the double sampling rules that dominate POR.
Any other double sampling rule with this property leads to the same population
adjustment (3) as SPOR2.
Some notes are in place. The bounded rationality assumptions underlying this
model make it natural to restrict attention to simple rules of behavior such as
through sequential evaluation of a single sampling rule. Two questions arise.
11 Such as the Proportional Imitation Rule and the Proportional Reviewing Rule (Schlag, 1998).542 J. Hofbauer and K.H. Schlag
Why use POR in this construction? The fact that POR prescribes to forget
own previous payoff is counterintuitive. However, reformulating the uniqueness
statement for double sampling made above, any other single sampling rule either
does not generate a strictly improving double sampling rule under sequential
evaluation or is dominated by SPOR2. In fact, it turns out to be difﬁcult to
generate interesting strictly improving rules through sequential evaluation. In
particular, the Proportional Imitation Rule, selected in Schlag (1998) as the “best”
single sampling rule does not generate a strictly improving double sampling rule
when it is evaluated sequentially.
Can alternative, possibly more complicated, methods for constructing a dou-
ble sampling rule outperform SPOR2? Strictly improving double sampling rules
that are not dominated by SPOR2 exist (Schlag, 1999). However, such rules do
not dominate POR (or any other single sampling rule that is undominated among
the strictly improving single sampling rules). Restricting attention to rules that
dominate POR reﬂects the condition that optimal behavior under multiple sam-
pling should outperform optimal behavior under single sampling. In this class,
SPOR2 performs best.
As for behavioral rules based on sample sizes n > 2 general results on
optimality have not been derived. Of course, in want of one procedure that works
well for all sample sizes, it is natural to employ SPORn. Notice that, following
(20), SPORn performs better the larger the sample size. Hence,
Proposition 6 SPORn dominates SPORm for all n > m ≥ 1.
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